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Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal
VOLUME 5

NUMBER 1

ENERGY LITIGATION UPDATE 2018
MARK D. CHRISTIANSEN*

I. Non-Operator v. Operator and Other Oil
and Gas Operations- Related Cases
A. Assignor sues working interest owners for failure to comply with
contractual obligation under 1994 assignment to notify assignor of any
future plans to plug the subject well.
In American Star Energy and Minerals Corporation v. Armor Petroleum,
Inc.,1 Armor appealed from the trial court’s judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, American Star, in this breach of contract action. The key
controversy in this case was whether the defendant-lessees were obligated,
under a provision of an assignment, to notify American Star of the proposal
and plan to plug the subject well and also offer American Star the
opportunity to purchase defendants’ interests in lieu of plugging the well.
More specifically, the well at issue was located within the Rice Morrow
Sand Formation unitized field established under OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §
287.1 et seq. The Plan of Unitization became effective December 1, 1994.
Some years later, the decision was made to plug the well. The unit sent
notice of such intent to all lessees of the Rice Morrow Sand Formation. The
* Edinger Leonard & Blakley PLLC, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. This paper was
originally presented, in substantially the same form, at the November 2018 Annual Eugene
Kuntz Conference on Natural Resources Law and Policy.
1. 89 O.B.J. 548 (Okla. App. 2018 - #115,490) (Not for Publication). For the published
Appellant’s brief and description of appeal, see American Star Energy and Minerals
Corporation v. Armor Petroleum, Inc., 2017 WL 3926079 (Okla. 2017).
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well was plugged and abandoned on December 3, 2009. The defendants,
who were lessees of the unit and successors to the obligations under the
assignment, did not notify American Star of the impending plugging of the
well or afford American Star the opportunity to exercise its purchase option
prior to the closure of the well.
American Star filed this suit seeking damages for the cost of drilling a
new well for purposes of developing a new formation. In their Answer, the
defendants asserted (1) the unit, rather than the defendants, had control over
the personal property of the well, and the unit should have been named in
the lawsuit; (2) establishment of the unit abrogated and/or modified any
rights, including notice rights, of American Star as to plugging and
abandonment of the well; and (3) a contradictory finding would be an
impermissible collateral attack on the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission’s order of unitization.
Following a bench trial, the trial court held for American Star, finding
the contractual obligations contained in the assignment were continuing,
assumed by the defendants, and did not conflict with the unitization plan or
statutes. American Star was awarded $200,000.00 in damages plus statutory
interest at 5.5% calculated from June 6, 2016, until paid. The defendants
appeal. In addressing certain of the key arguments of the defendants, the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals stated in part as follows:
1. The court agreed that the unit had no obligation to notify American
Star of its intent to plug the well. The unit operator was only required to
provide notice to lessees of the subject tract, and American Star was not a
lessee.
2. However, the defendants were obligated to provide notice to
American Star pursuant to the terms of their assignment. Contrary to the
assertion of the defendants, this contractual requirement in no manner
conflicted with the notice requirements of the Plan of Unitization, or of the
unitization statutes in general. The legal obligations under the assignment
regarding the provision of notice by the defendants remained fully
enforceable.
3. Finally, the trial court did modify the portion of the trial court’s
judgment that provided for interest at the rate of 5.5%2 until paid. The court
found that the statutes providing for post-judgment interest would be
adhered to by stating in the judgment that “[t]he judgment shall earn

2. The statutory post judgment interest rate for 2016 was 5.5% under OKLA. STAT. tit.
12, § 727.1 (2013).
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statutory interest in accord with OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 727.1 (2013) from
June 6, 2016, until paid.”3
The court of appeals concluded that the trial court correctly entered
judgment in favor of plaintiff. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed
as modified.
For a lawsuit addressing disputes arising from informal oil and gas
dealings and related tort claims among oil and gas entities and individuals,
see Online Oil, Inc. v. CO&G Production Group, LLC.4
II. Royalty Owner Litigation
A. Court addresses continuing disputes as to scope of post-wellhead
expenses that may be factored into the computation of gas royalty payments
in Oklahoma.
The final appellate decision in Pummill v. Hancock Exploration LLC 5
(Pummill II) presented an appeal of the District Court’s declaratory
judgment on the merits, following a bench trial, rejecting the oil and gaslessee defendants’ contention that they were allowed to proportionately
charge certain expenses against the plaintiffs’ royalty interest payments.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals observed that “[t]he question of
consequence on appeal involves Defendants’ challenge to the trial court’s
determination of when the natural gas at issue here became a ‘marketable
product.’”6
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in earlier proceedings in the case,
Pummill v. Hancock Exploration LLC 7 (Pummill I), was presented with the
defendants’ petition for writ of certiorari to review the trial court’s four
lengthy summary judgment orders in favor of the plaintiffs, which had been
affirmed by the court of appeals. The underlying lawsuit asserted that the
defendants had underpaid royalties by reducing royalty payments by certain
post-production expenses. The summary judgment orders were titled
“Summary Judgment Issue 1—Lease Language; Summary Judgment Issue

3. Id. ¶ 12.
4. 2018 OK CIV APP 1, 419 P.3d 337.
5. 2018 OK CIV APP 48, 419 P.3d 1268.
6. 419 P.3d at 1270. The “marketable product” standard was recognized in the
landmark Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in Mittesltaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.,
1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203.
7. 2014 OK 97, 341 P.3d 69.
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II—Form of Contract; Summary Judgment Issue III—Fuel Gas; and
Summary Judgment Issue IV—Interest.”8
The defendant oil and gas companies asserted four primary issues on
appeal: “Issue 1. The express language of their leases does not abrogate or
negate the implied covenant to market in any way; Issue 2. The current or
future use of a POP, POI or any other form of contract, instead of a fee
based agreement with Enogex, does not change the amount of royalties due
under the leases; Issue 3. Appellants are entitled to receive royalties on gas
used off the lease or in the manufacture of products at the gas plant; and
Issue 4. Appellants owe interest on royalties not timely paid without prior
demand from the royalty owners.”9
In an unusual step, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, on its own initiative,
set the matter for oral argument at a hearing conducted on November 5,
2014. At the hearing, the parties affirmed that Issue IV was not contested.10
As to the other three issues, the court found that “[t]he briefs filed and the
oral argument . . . reveal that facts which could affect the resolution of the
district court Issues I through III need to be addressed before the factfinder, the district court.”11
The Oklahoma Supreme Court vacated the ruling of the court of appeals,
affirmed the district court in part (as to Issue IV) and reversed the district
court in part (as to Issues I, II and III). The case was remanded to the
district court to hear evidence and decide the disputed fact issues. The
rulings of the district court on remand, which favored the Pummill
plaintiffs, are described in detail on pages 1272 and 1273 of the 2018
appellate opinion in Pummill II.12 The defendants appealed the district
court’s judgment on remand. Three amici curiae sought leave and were
allowed to file briefs in support of the defendants. An additional two groups
sought leave and were permitted to file amici curiae briefs in support of the
royalty-owner plaintiffs.
In affirming the district court’s judgment at the conclusion of the trial in
favor of the Pummill Plaintiffs, the court held in part as follows:
1. Regarding the standard of review in this appeal, the Oklahoma Court
of Appeals found that the primary relief sought by Pummill, and ultimately
by the defendants, “concerned their competing views of the point at which
gas production from the well becomes a ‘marketable product’ for purposes
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
2018 OK CIV APP 48, ¶¶ 10-18, 419 P.3d at 1272 – 1273.
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of calculating royalties due”13 under the leases. The court of appeals further
observed that the Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized “that oil and
gas leases are ‘contracts,’ and has characterized an oil and gas producer’s
liability under a lease as ‘purely contractual’ in nature (citations
omitted).”14 The court of appeals found “that there is a ‘presumption of
correctness’ afforded to a trial court’s findings of fact, even if those
findings were adopted by the court from written findings prepared by
counsel [for proposed use by the court] with minimal changes. . . . This
Court will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported
by any competent evidence, including reasonable inferences derived from
that evidence.”15
2. The court of appeals found that “[t]he issue of when natural gas first
becomes ‘marketable’ has been the source of much contention and
consternation in both legal and oil and gas circles for several years.”16
3. In summarizing certain legal principles, the court noted in paragraphs
26, 27 and 28 of its opinion that a lessee has an implied duty to obtain a
"marketable product," including the cost of preparing the gas for market
and getting the gas to the place of sale in marketable form. As a general
rule, the lessee may not deduct from royalty payments the costs of
gathering, transportation, compression, dehydration, or blending if those
costs are required to create a marketable product, unless the lease provides
otherwise. The duty to market further includes the obligation to obtain the
best price available. The lessee's obligation is not unlimited. In Mittelstaedt,
where the court considered a "gross proceeds" lease, the court recognized
that, although expenses to obtain marketable production are not chargeable
against royalty, reasonable "post-production expenses" might be applied
against the royalty if the expenses involve "enhancing the value" of an
already marketable product, and the lessee shows that the expenditures
resulted in a proportionate increase in royalty revenue. 17 Unfortunately, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Mittelstaedt did not define the meaning of
“marketable product,” nor has it done so since.18

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. ¶ 20.
Id.
Id. ¶ 21-22.
Id. ¶ 25.
Id. ¶¶ 26-27.
Id. ¶ 28.
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4. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the defendants
failed to sustain their burden of proving that they were entitled to deduct
proportionate post-production costs from royalties under Mittelstaedt.19
5. The court of appeals stated that the defendants were urging the court
to adopt a definition of “marketable” identical to that of the Kansas
Supreme Court in Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas. In that
decision, the court found that production is merchantable once the operator
has put it into a condition acceptable to a purchaser in a good faith
transaction.20 The defendants asserted that the gas at issue here was a
marketable product at either or both (a) the custody meter, and (b) the
wellhead where the defendants alleged the existence of hypothetical gas
buyers.21
6. Turning to the defendants’ assertion that the court should adopt the
Kansas Supreme Court’s holding in Fawcett, the court concluded that
Fawcett had limited application in the Pummill case for at least three
reasons: (a) The first and most obvious reason, as noted by the court, was
that the Oklahoma Court of Appeals is bound to follow Oklahoma
precedent (citing Mittelsteadt and Wood which were found to clearly apply
to this litigation); (b) second, the court of appeals found no wording in
Fawcett suggesting that the Kansas Supreme Court intended to overturn
what the court of appeals described as the existing rule that a lesseeoperator has the duty to make gas marketable and that it must do so free of
cost for field services to royalty owners; and (c) Fawcett was factually
distinguishable in that the first, actual sales of gas occurred at the
wellhead, and the lease language clearly made reference to royalties
measured by sales “at the mouth of the well” or “if sold at the well” in
contrast to the “gross proceeds” language at issue here. That said, the court
of appeals concluded that even if it used the definition of “marketable
production” used in Fawcett, it would reach the same result under the
circumstances presented in this case, pursuant to the court’s standard of
review of whether the trial court’s decision was supported by competent
evidence. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision on the
marketability question.22
7. The court of appeals stated that it found no error in the trial court’s
finding that, in essence, the defendants could not employ “percentage of

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. ¶ 41.
Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas, 352 P.3d 1032 (Kan. 1994).
2018 OK CIV APP 48, ¶29, 419 P.3d at 1276.
Id. ¶44.
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proceeds” contracts23 simply in order to avoid the court’s decision
prohibiting certain cost deductions from royalties.24
8. Finally, with regard to the defendants’ argument that the ruling of the
trial court would have wide-ranging, destructive ramifications for the oil
and gas industry, the court of appeals found that this argument exaggerated
the extent to which the issue presented to the court could be applied outside
the limited realm of this case, and also ignored the requirements
Mittelstaedt places on lessees in the position of the defendants. The court
noted that this was the case particularly in the omission to recognize that
the defendants did not present evidence going to each of the elements of
Mittelstaedt.25
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling in favor of the
plaintiff royalty owners.
B. Court of Appeals reverses certification of class of royalty owners.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals, in Whisenant v. Strat Land Exploration
Co.,26 reversed a decision of the District Court of Beaver County certifying
a royalty owner class. Whisenant sued Strat Land alleging, on behalf of a
proposed class of similarly situated royalty owners, the underpayment or
non-payment of royalties on natural gas and its constituents from certain
Oklahoma wells. The evidence showed that the putative class included
approximately eighty-eight Oklahoma wells and approximately 1,000
royalty owners throughout the United States.27 The proposed class wells
were located within, or adjacent to, Ellis, Harper, Beaver and Texas
Counties.28
Whisenant asserted that one of the issues of law and fact common to the
proposed class was “whether gas [is] in Marketable Condition at the meter
run/gathering line inlet”.29 He additionally argued, among other issues, that
Strat Land paid royalty to him and to the proposed class using a common
method based on the net revenue Strat Land received under its marketing
contracts rather than paying royalties based on the gross amount received

23.
¶ 45.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

The court also referred to “PIP” contracts which were not defined in the opinion. Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 47.
2018 OK CIV APP 65, 429 P.3d 703.
Id. ¶ 15 n.11.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 3.
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by the midstream purchaser from its sale of the gas at interstate or intrastate
markets.30
The district court certified a class, subject to a series of exclusions not
described below, consisting of all royalty owners in Oklahoma wells that:
(a) [were] operated by [Strat Land]; (b) marketed by Strat Land
to DCP Midstream (f/k/a Duke Energy Field Services)’ and (c)
that have produced gas and/or gas constituents (such as residue
gas, natural gas liquids, helium, or condensate) from February
12, 2009 to the time Class Notice is given31
The district court granted class certification under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §
2023(B)(3). Strat Land filed an interlocutory appeal of the class
certification order.32
The court of appeals observed that the primary issue on appeal is
whether there are common questions of law or fact. However, since the
class was certified below under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2023(B)(3), the court
noted the additional requirement that common issues predominate over
other questions. The court stated, early in its discussion, that “[i]n the
present case, class certification is inappropriate because a ‘highly
individualized’ review of the facts pertaining to each of the numerous wells
is necessary.”33 In concluding that the lower court’s order granting class
certification should be reversed, certain of the key findings of the court of
appeals included the following:
First, the court found that the standards in Oklahoma for determining
whether certain types of post-production costs may be deducted in the
computation of gas royalty payments, as recognized in the landmark case of
Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.,34 require a fact-intensive inquiry.
That the trial court found “that Strat Land had a common corporate policy
of not paying royalty on the gross value of the gas produced under the
leases”35 was insufficient to satisfy the predominance requirement of OKLA.

30. Id. ¶ 4.
31. Id. ¶ 5.
32. Under Oklahoma state court procedure, an order granting or denying class
certification is “subject to a de novo standard of review by any appellate court reviewing the
order.” 12 OKLA. STAT. SUPP. 2014 § 2023(C)(2).
33. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals cited in support of this conclusion its earlier
decision in Strack v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2017 OK CIV APP 53, ¶ 32, 405 P.3d 131, cert.
denied.
34. 1998 OK 7, 954 P.2d 1203.
35. Id. ¶ 12.
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STAT. tit. 12, § 2023(B)(3).36 Rather, in discussing the complex analysis of
determining whether the costs deducted in the computation of gas royalties
were expenses necessary to make the gas a marketable product, the court of
appeals stated that “highly individualized and fact-intensive review of each
Class Members’ claim would be necessary to determine if [the defendant]
underpaid oil or gas royalties.”37
Second, as a consequence of the above, the court of appeals rejected
Whisenant’s contention that “[c]lass action treatment will allow a large
number of similarly situated individuals to prosecute their common claims
in a single forum, simultaneously, efficiently, and without duplication of
time, expense and effort on the part of those individuals, witnesses, the
courts and/or [Strat Land].”38 The court was likewise unpersuaded by
Whisenant’s contention that disposing of the case as a class action would
“avoid the possibility of inconsistent and/or varying results in this matter
arising out of the same facts.”39
Third, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals declined Whisenant’s assertion
that “determination of the quality of gas and other facts pertinent to each
well are susceptible to generalized proof.”40
Fourth, the appellate court rejected the use of assumptions parallel to
those used in the case of Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,41 finding:
[A]n assumption analogous to that forwarded by the employees
in Tyson—i.e., an assumption that, for each gas well within the
proposed class, the royalty-valuation point and deductible costs
can be set at the same average point and amount — is
unwarranted. 42
The court concluded that a class-wide determination based either on the
variables as they exist with Whisenant’s one well “or on an average
sampling (i.e., of gas quality, proximity of interstate pipelines, availability
36. The court of appeals cited EQT Production Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347 (4th Cir.
2014) (“Even a plethora of identical practices will not satisfy the predominance requirement
if the defendants’; common conduct has little bearing on the central issue in the litigation –
in this case, whether the defendants underpaid royalties.”)
37. Citing Strack v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2017 OK CIV APP 53, ¶ 32, 405 P.3d 131, and
Foster v. Apache Corp., 285 F.R.D. 632, 638 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
38. Whisenant, 2018 OK CIV APP 65, ¶ 16, 429 P.3d at 710 (internal quotation
omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id. ¶ 17.
41. 136 S.Ct. 1036 (2016).
42. Whisenant, 2018 OK CIV APP 65, ¶ 20, 429 P.3d at 710-11.
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and proximity of processing plants, market realities, and so forth) would
result in distorted and inconsistent awards to the various members of the
class.”43 Citing Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Marez,44 the court noted that “a
judgment must be based upon evidence that establishes essential facts as
probably, not merely possibly being true.”45
Fifth, the court of appeals found “[a] reliance upon facts derived from
other wells would be as impermissible as it would have been to determine
liability in Wal-Mart based upon generalized evidence derived from other
store managers.”46 The court of appeals rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that
class action certification was appropriate here based on their contention that
the case would rely on admissible expert testimony to prove class-wide
liability.
Finally, the court held that, even if Strat Land paid royalties to the
members of the putative class using a common method, “the establishment
of this common fact fails to resolve the issue of liability, an issue which
remains individual rather than common.”47 The court specifically rejected
Whisenant’s contention that the alleged common method was either right or
wrong, class-wide.
Concluding that the predominance and superiority requirements for class
certification under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2023(B)(3) were not satisfied in
this case, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order granting class
certification. Whisenant’s subsequent petition for certiorari review by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court was denied by order issued on October 1, 2018.
Mandate was issued on October 31, 2018.
III. Oil and Gas Lease Cancellation, Termination and Breach of Obligation
Cases (Other Than Royalty)
A. Oklahoma Supreme Court resolves oil and gas lease termination claims,
the “capability” doctrine and related legal principles.
The case of Hall v. Galmor,48 presented the appeal of the trial court’s
judgment, after a bench trial, denying the appellants’ petition to cancel oil
and gas leases of the appellee. “Between the years 1954 and 2008, the
predecessors-in-interest [to Galmor] entered into 30 oil and gas leases
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. ¶ 21.
1996 OK CIV APP 137, ¶ 8, 931 P.2d 760.
Whisenant, 2018 OK CIV APP 65, ¶ 16, 429 P.3d at 711.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id. ¶ 23.
2018 OK 59, 427 P.3d 1052.
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covering mineral interests in lands located in Beckham County,
Oklahoma.”49 All 30 leases contained habendum clauses that made the
leases valid for primary terms lasting between 90 days and 10 years, and
then for secondary terms thereafter lasting as long as oil or gas was
“produced” from the leased premises.50 Some 29 of the leases also
contained “cessation of production” clauses that gave the lessee a grace
period ranging between 60 days and 6 months during which to re-establish
production either by reworking the existing well or by drilling a new well.51
Galmor’s predecessors-in-interest drilled seven wells during the primary
terms of the leases. Those wells were located on lands covered by fourteen
of the 30 leases at issue. The lands covered by two of the fourteen leases
were also subject to voluntary pooling agreements with lands covered by
six more leases on which no wells had been drilled. The lands covered by
the remaining ten leases did not have completed wells and were not
otherwise held under a voluntary pooling agreement or a statutory spacing
unit. During the secondary terms of the fourteen leases on which wells had
been drilled, six of the seven wells actually produced oil and gas. Some of
the wells drilled prior to the 1990’s ceased production for a number of years
during that decade, but afterwards attained their previous production
levels.52
Writer’s Note: The 36-page opinion in the Hall case (when viewed on
the OSCN website) contains multiple pages describing the factual and
procedural background in this factually-complex lawsuit. The readers are
referred to that opinion for a description of the additional facts and history
of the case. In the interest of brevity, this summary of the Hall decision will
now move to a description of some of the many rulings in the case.
In May 2016, at the conclusion of a two-day bench trial, the trial court
issued judgment against Hall on his lease termination claims and other
claims. The district court relied on the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s prior
decision in Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.,53 where the court held that a
lease will continue as long as the well is capable of production in paying
quantities subject, of course, to any violations of any other express
provisions such as the shut-in royalty clause or implied covenants such as
the covenant to market. The trial court also relied upon James Energy Co. v.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. ¶ 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
1994 OK 23, ¶ 21, 869 P.2d 323, 329.
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HCG Energy Corp.,54 where the court held that “the lessor must demand
that an implied covenant be complied with before a court of equity will
grant a forfeiture” and that “the lessor, not a stranger to the lease . . . , must
make demand on the lessee to comply with the implied covenants.”55
The trial court specifically found that all seven of the wells at issue were
capable of producing in paying quantities during the period they were shut
in, and that no demand to comply with implied covenants was made by the
royalty owners to the lessees. Hall appealed the trial court’s judgment to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court which retained the appeal. In affirming in part,
and reversing in part, the judgment of the trial court, some of the pertinent
rulings of the court were as follows:
1. Hall argued on appeal that, in order for a well to be “capable” of
producing in paying quantities, “the well must be maintained in turn-key
condition such that it will produce in paying quantities immediately upon
being turned ‘on.’”56 The court found that this proposed definition was first
announced by the Texas Court of Appeals in a 1993 decision.57 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court had earlier stated that “the characteristic that
distinguishes a ‘shut-in’ well from a wells experiencing a ‘cessation of
production’” is that the well is “capable” of production in paying quantities
in the first situation.58 In assessing whether a well is “capable” of producing
in paying quantities, the court ruled that the relevant time period to be
considered is the moment prior to the shutting-in of the well. “So long as
the well was complete and was producing in paying quantities when it was
shut in, the well remains ‘capable’ and the habendum clause in the leases
remains satisfied throughout the shut-in period.”59 The court affirmed the
trial court’s rejection of Hall’s proposal that Oklahoma courts adopt the
Texas rule and require operators to continually maintain their shut-in wells
in turn-key condition.60
2. The Oklahoma Supreme Court then reviewed the evidence presented
at trial bearing on the capability of the subject wells. Hall primarily
54. 1992 OK 117, ¶¶ 17–18, 847 P.2d 333, 338.
55. Hall, 2018 OK 59, ¶ 10.
56. Id. ¶ 23.
57. Id. ¶ 24 (citing Hydrocarbon Management, Inc. v. Tracker Exploration, Inc., 861
S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App. 1993)). The Texas Supreme Court is cited as having later approved
that definition of “capability” in its decision in Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94
S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2002).
58. Hall, 2018 OK 59, ¶ 21.
59. Id. ¶ 26.
60. Id.
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challenged the trial court’s factual finding of capability on the basis that the
wells were in disrepair after being shut-in for over four years. The court
found that its analysis in the preceding discussion (paragraph 1, above)
disposed of this argument. Evidence of the wells’ current or post-shut-in
condition is not relevant to whether the wells were capable of producing in
paying quantities on the date the wells were shut-in.61
3. This court’s affirmation of the trial court’s finding of “capability”
prevents Hall from contending that “production” ceased. As previously
stated, the court defined the term “production” as meaning “capable of
producing in paying quantities.” If the wells are capable of paying
production, then they must be considered producing wells, and the
habendum clauses permitting the leases to continue “for so long . . . as oil
or gas continues to be produced” have not been breached. Consequently,
the trial court did not err in finding the leases were still viable.62
4. Hall further contended that the cessation of production clauses of the
oil and gas leases resulted in the termination of the leases. However, citing
Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals,63 the court found that a well’s capability to
produce in paying quantities will satisfy both the habendum clause and the
cessation of production clause of the lease, and the cessation of production
clause is only triggered where a well has become incapable of paying
production.64
5. Hall next argued that the above outcomes would allow a lessee to “sit”
on a well capable of production in paying quantities, without any actual
production, for an indefinite time period, thereby rendering the cessation of
production time limits of no effect. However, the court responded by
observing that the lessor could make a written demand for compliance with
the implied covenant to market, which would force the lessee to commence
actual production of the gas out of the ground and market the production or
else face the possibility of lease cancellation.65
6. The court found that the trial court addressed Hall’s claims for breach
of the express lease terms by finding that the wells were capable of “paying
production,” and then proceeded to assess whether the leases could be
cancelled for breach of any other express or implied provisions or
covenants. The trial court correctly found that the leases could not be

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. ¶¶ 27–29.
Id. ¶ 33.
1994 OK 23, 869 P.2d 323.
Id. ¶¶ 34–37.
Id. ¶¶ 38–39.
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canceled due to a failure to satisfy the prerequisite for a demand to market
made by the lessors.66
7. Hall additionally argued that Oklahoma’s statutory Pugh clause67
required the trial court to invalidate Galmor’s interest in the Pugh Clause
Lands—i.e., those portions of the leased lands falling outside the two 160acre spacing units.68 Hall argued that Section 87.1(b) “would permit
Galmor to retain the Pugh Clause Lands only if a producing well had been
drilled on those lands within a 90-day grace period following expiration of
the lease’s primary term, which did not happen.”69 After a detailed review
and discussion of this so-called statutory Pugh clause, the court concluded
that the effect of OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(b) is as follows: In cases of
spacing units of 160 acres or more, a producer will have 90 days after the
expiration of the primary term of the lease to develop the lands outside the
spacing unit. If the producer does not do so, the lease will expire as to those
lands.70 The court further stated “[s]ection 87.1(b) was meant to prevent a
unit well’s production from satisfying the habendum clause of any lease for
more than ninety days beyond the expiration of the primary term as to
acreage outside of the unit when the leased premises, or any portion thereof,
is included in a unit of 160 acres or more.”71 Consequently, the court
concluded that Galmor’s leasehold interests in the Pugh Clause Lands
should be forfeited, “unless he can demonstrate that Section 87.1(b) is
somehow unconstitutional.”72 The court then found the statute to be
constitutional.73
8. Finally, Hall argued that the trial court erred in quieting title in favor
of Galmor in lands covered by Non-Unit oil and gas leases (i.e., leases
covering lands on which no well had ever been drilled by Galmor or his
predecessors). Since no wells were ever drilled on those lands and there
was no evidence showing that such lands had been included in a spacing
unit or pooling agreement, the habendum clauses of the Non-Unit leases
were not satisfied. Galmor’s leasehold rights in those lands terminated upon
the expiration of the primary terms of the Non-Unit leases. The trial court
erred in quieting title to that portion of the lands in Galmor. Title should
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. ¶¶ 40–42.
52 O.S. § 87.1(b).
Id. ¶ 43.
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Id. ¶ 54.
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Id. ¶¶ 56–66.
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instead be quieted in favor of Hall due to his Top Leases covering those
lands. To the extent the court reversed the trial court’s judgment against
Hall on his quiet title claims concerning the Pugh Clause Lands and lands
covered by Non-Unit leases, the court likewise vacated the portion of the
judgment denying his cause of action for slander of title as to those lands.74
The court remanded the case, based on the above rulings, with
instructions to conduct further proceedings in a manner consistent with the
court’s opinion.75
IV. Oil and Gas Contracts, Transactions and Title Matters
A. Court addresses dispute over whether a binding contract to sell oil and
gas properties was formed as a result of e-mail negotiations and
communications.
The court’s ruling in Le Norman Operating LLC v. Chalker Energy
Partners III, LLC,76 is likely to be criticized by those who favor certainty in
contracting. The Le Norman case addresses several issues that can easily
arise, and lead to litigation, in energy and resources transactions. It
illustrates the complications and resulting litigation risks associated with (a)
negotiating the more-detailed terms of a transaction by e-mail, (b) engaging
in communications and negotiations governed by the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act, infra, and (c) attempting to contract with (or as a part of)
a group of counter-parties aligned in the transaction but with each having its
own individual decision whether to accept or reject the final proposals.
The Chalker Energy parties (Sellers) desired to sell their interests in
certain oil and gas properties located in the Texas panhandle. They
engaged the Raymond James firm to conduct the sale process. The group
of Sellers also designated Chalker Energy Partners (Chalker Energy) to
function as their designated agent in conducting the sale.77 Remora, one of
the Sellers, monitored the sales efforts and reported back to the other
Sellers. “The Sellers entered into the ‘Chalker Engagement Agreement,’
which set out the process by which potential sales of [the assets] would be
considered.”78

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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In August 2012, Raymond James sent an e-mail to potential buyers
announcing the sale of the assets and advising as to the person to whom
interested parties should direct their inquiries. Le Norman was one of the
parties who received that e-mail and decided to engage in the bidding
process.79 On September 30, 2012, Le Norman and Chalker signed a
confidentiality agreement so that Le Norman could view the information in
the virtual data room concerning the assets and participate in the bid
process. A form Purchase and Sale Agreement was available in the data
room for potential buyers to review.80 In addition to confidentiality
provisions, the confidentiality agreement provided in relevant part, in
section 18:
No Obligation. The Parties hereto understand that unless and
until a definitive agreement has been executed and delivered, no
contract or agreement providing for a transaction between the
Parties shall be deemed to exist and neither Party will be under
any legal obligation of any kind whatsoever with respect to such
transaction by virtue of this or any written or oral expression
thereof, except, in the case of this Agreement, for the matters
specially agreed to herein. For purposes of this Agreement, the
term “definitive agreement” does not include an executed letter
of intent or any other preliminary written agreement or offer,
unless specifically so designated in writing and executed by both
Parties.81
The confidentiality agreement further stated that Chalker Energy
reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to: ... (c) discontinue
consideration of a transaction at any time; (d) reject any and all
proposals made by any party with regard to a transaction; (e)
terminate discussions and negotiations with [Le Norman] or any
party at any time for any reason; and (f) conduct the process
relating to a possible transaction in any manner it deems
appropriate or change the procedure for conducting that
process.82
Raymond James made a presentation to potential bidders, which Le
Norman attended, advising as to the bid procedure and the use of the virtual
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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data room containing detailed information regarding the assets and other
materials. The potential bidders were instructed to include with their bids a
marked copy of the proposed form of purchase and sale agreement provided
in the data room, indicating additions or deletions required by the bidder in
order to sign the document as a definitive purchase and sale agreement.83
The bidders were advised that, once Chalker Energy received bids, each
member of the Sellers group “shall be given 24 hours to elect to sell their
interest once the purchase price has been determined.”84 The presentation
further advised potential bidders that, “[u]pon the negotiation of the PSA,
each [Seller] shall be given 48 hours to elect to accept the terms of the PSA
and execute the appropriate documents.”85
The data room presentation provided a further disclaimer to Le Norman
and the other potential bidders, stating:
[Chalker Energy] reserves the right to negotiate with one or
more prospective parties at any time and to enter into a definitive
agreement for a transaction without prior notice to you or to
other prospective parties. [Chalker Energy] also reserves the
right to terminate, at any time, further participation in the due
diligence and proposal process by any party and to modify any
procedures without providing any reason therefore. [Chalker
Energy] intends to conduct its business in the ordinary manner
during the evaluation and offer period; however, [it] reserves the
right to take any action, whether in or out of the ordinary course
of business, which in its sole discretion it deems necessary or
prudent in the conduct of such business.86
On November 5, 2012, Le Norman submitted a bid via e-mail offering
$322 million for 100% of the assets (i.e., requiring that all members of the
Seller group agree to sell under the proposed terms). Le Norman’s bid
stated that it was subject to the execution by the parties of a mutually
acceptable Purchase and Sale Agreement. Le Norman also included with
its bid a redlined copy of the proposed form of purchase and sale agreement
showing the changes required by Le Norman. Chalker Energy and Remora
both indicated that the changes of Le Norman were insignificant.87

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
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“Upon receipt of the first round of bids, Raymond James asked the two
highest bidders, [Le Norman] and Jones Energy, to increase their bids.”88
Le Norman revised its bid to $345 million for 100% of the assets, and Le
Norman again included a proposed purchase and sale agreement based on
the form provided by the Sellers in the virtual data room. Chalker Energy
selected Le Norman’s bid to present to the other Sellers and gave them 24
hours to respond. When the elections of the other Sellers resulted in only
82% of the assets being committed to Le Norman’s offer, the parties
continued their negotiations and made several offers and counter-offers.
Those negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful. On November 14, 2012,
Le Norman informed Chalker Energy by e-mail that it would no longer
pursue the transaction, however it left open the possibility that some
agreement might be reached in the future.89
On November 19, 2012, in response to a new offer from the Sellers for a
smaller percentage of the assets, Le Norman sent an e-mail to Raymond
James proposing new terms. The e-mail subject line stated, “RE: Counter
Proposal.”90 Among a total of seven deal points, Le Norman offered $230
million for 67% of the assets and provided that it was subject to a “PSA
similar to what we returned with the above caveats,”91 and also required the
execution by the parties of a joint operating agreement (to be attached to the
purchase and sale agreement) and a non-compete agreement. Unlike Le
Norman’s prior bids, this counter proposal did not make any reference to
the bid procedure and it advised Raymond James that Le Norman would not
accept any changes to the proposal and would not extend the deadlines
stated in its proposal.92
On November 20, 2012, Raymond James replied to Le Norman’s counter
proposal, stating: “We have the group on board to deliver 67% subject to a
mutually agreeable PSA. We are calling to discuss next steps and timing.
Chalker et al. will be turning a PSA tonight to respond to your last draft.
Please give me a call to discuss scheduling and timing.”93 On the same
date, Chalker Energy sent an e-mail to the other members of the Seller
group advising of the e-mail sent earlier in the day to Le Norman,
discussing the uncertain timing, and asking that the Sellers “monitor your email for updates and/or any requests that may be necessary to complete the
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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Id.
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preparation of agreements for the sale.”94 The parties continued to work
toward finalizing the purchase and sale agreement. The parties needed to
complete key exhibits to that agreement, as well as an escrow agreement,
non-compete agreement and a joint operating agreement. “E-mails
continued to pass between the parties including an e-mail from Chalker
Energy to [Le Norman] discussing the Assets and referring to them as ‘what
is being sold to Le Norman.’”95 At the end of the day on November 21st
(the day before Thanksgiving Day), Chalker Energy e-mailed Le Norman
an updated draft of the purchase and sale agreement and state that it would
not expected to hear from Le Norman until Monday, November 26th.96
Also on November 21st, a representative from Jones Energy sent a new
offer to Chalker Energy that Chalker viewed as providing benefits that the
Le Norman deal did not offer. On November 23rd, Chalker submitted
ballots to the Sellers to determine if they were willing to negotiate a sale of
the assets to Jones Energy, and the Sellers responded in the affirmative.
Chalker and Jones Energy negotiated final terms for the purchase and sale
agreement.97
On November 28, 2012, the Sellers and Jones Energy finalized and
signed their purchase and sale agreement. On the same day, Le Norman
delivered a purchase and sale agreement to Chalker Energy. Upon learning
of the deal reached between the Sellers and Jones Energy, Le Norman sent
several letters demanding that the Sellers “honor the contract they had
entered into on November 19-20.”98 The purchase and sale transaction with
Jones Energy proceeded forward and the sale of assets closed on December
12, 2012. However, when Jones Energy learned of the claims and demands
of Le Norman, it refused to release the escrowed funds and asserted that the
Sellers’ failure to disclose Le Norman’s demands was a breach of the Jones
Energy purchase and sale agreement.99
Le Norman sued the Sellers asserting that they breached their agreement
to sell a 67% interest in the assets for $230 million.100 Le Norman also
sued Jones Energy for tortious interference with Le Norman’s alleged
contract, but that suit was later settled. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Sellers finding, among other things, that the Sellers
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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had not reached a binding contract to sell any part of the assets to Le
Norman. However, the trial court specifically denied Sellers’ motion for
summary judgment on the grounds of (a) the statute of frauds, with the
Sellers contending that there was a failure to include sufficient property
descriptions, and (b) Sellers’ assertion that there was no acceptance of the
alleged offer. The parties appealed.101
In addressing Le Norman’s assertion on appeal that a contract had been
reached with the Sellers, certain of the key holdings of the Texas Court of
Appeals were as follows:
First, the court described some of the pertinent rules of Texas contract
law relating to the formation of contracts:
An enforceable and legally binding contract exists if it is
sufficiently definite, certain, and clear in its essential terms. A
binding agreement may exist when parties agree on some terms
sufficient to create a contract, leaving other provisions for later
negotiation. When an agreement leaves essential (or material)
matters open for future negotiation and those negotiations are
unsuccessful, however, the agreement ‘is not binding upon the
parties and merely constitutes an agreement to agree. The
question of what terms are essential to a contract is determined
on a contract-by-contract basis, depending on the subject matter
of the contract at issue. The parties must have a meeting of the
minds and must communicate consent to the essential terms of
the alleged agreement, which is determined based on an
objective standard of what the parties said and did rather than on
their subjective states of mind.102 [citations omitted]
Second, the court found that the confidentiality agreement provided that
a letter of intent or preliminary agreement was not a definitive agreement.
However, the confidentiality agreement did not describe what constituted a
definitive agreement. After reviewing the facts in this case in detail,
including examples of specific members of the Seller group who stated that
they intended to enter a binding agreement with Le Norman before a
definitive agreement was reached, the court concluded that a fact issue
existed as to whether the November 19-20 e-mail chain and subsequent
written elections were sufficient to constitute a definitive agreement for the

101. Id. at 37.
102. Id. at 41.
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sale of the assets.103 Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Sellers.104
Third, the court reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in
favor of the Sellers based on the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(UETA) and the trial court’s finding that the parties did not agree to
conduct business electronically, and because the e-mail lacks an electronic
signature.105 The court first reviewed the pertinent elements of the UETA:
Under the UETA, a legal requirement of a writing can be
satisfied with an electronic record, and a legal requirement of a
signature can be satisfied by an electronic signature. TEX. BUS.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 322.007(c), (d) (West 2015). The UETA
applies “only to transactions between parties each of which has
agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means.” Id. §
322.005(b) (West 2015). Contrary to the Sellers’ argument, the
UETA does not require an explicit agreement to conduct
transactions by electronic means, but instead provides, “Whether
the parties agree to conduct a transaction by electronic means is
determined from the context and surrounding circumstances,
including the parties’ conduct.” Id.106
The court reviewed the facts and circumstances presented in this lawsuit
and concluded that “the conduct of the parties here in engaging in
negotiations and other relevant business via electronic means constitutes at
least some evidence that the parties agreed to conduct some of their
transactions electronically.”107 The trial court’s summary judgment ruling
against Le Norman on this issue was reversed.108
After addressing other issues in the appeal, the court of appeals affirmed
in part and reversed in part the judgment below and remanded the case for
further proceedings.109
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V. Marketing and Refining of Oil and Gas Production
A. Widely followed rulings of the Bankruptcy Court in In re Sabine Oil &
Gas Corp., allowing the debtor to reject midstream services contracts, are
affirmed by the district court and Second Circuit.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
was presented in 2017, in In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp.,110 with the appeal
of three highly-publicized rulings of the bankruptcy court in the Chapter 11
proceedings of Sabine Oil & Gas Corp. Those rulings determined that
“appellants’ agreements with Sabine to provide gathering services did not
run with the land under Texas property law.”111 The court therefore granted
Sabine’s motion to reject the agreements as executory pursuant 11 U.S.C. §
365(a). In reviewing the bankruptcy court’s rulings, the district court
recognized at the outset:
[I]t is not possible for a debtor to reject a covenant that “runs
with the land,” since such a covenant creates a property interest
that is not extinguished through bankruptcy. The parties here
agree on the foregoing, and therefore their dispute comes down
to whether the Agreements run with the land and therefore
cannot be rejected pursuant to § 365(a).112
After a detailed review of pertinent case law and the United States
Bankruptcy Code, the court rejected the appellants’ assertion that the
gathering services agreements dedicated the oil and gas leases of Sabine to
the contracts in a way that conveyed a property interest in the lands. Rather,
the court concluded that the agreements granted to appellants “merely [the]
contractual right to be the exclusive providers of certain services for gas
and condensate produced in certain areas.”113 Since the agreements did not
touch and concern the land, the bankruptcy court did not err in holding that
the agreements did not run with the land as real covenants.
The court also rejected the appellants’ argument that agreements
constituted equitable servitudes under Texas law. The district court found
that the appellants’ agreements did not satisfy the requirements for being
equitable servitudes since, among other reasons, the agreements did not

110.
111.
112.
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Id. at 871.
Id. at 874.
Id. at 875.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss1/2

2019]

Energy Litigation Update 2018

23

“limit Sabine’s use of its property interests in the Dedicated Areas.
Moreover, the Agreements benefit only appellants, not their land.”114
The district court affirmed the orders of the bankruptcy court. The gas
processing companies (Nordheim) appealed.
In a decision issued in May 2018,115 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit addressed the appeal of the judgment of the Southern
District of New York. The parties to the appeal agreed that for a real
covenant to run with the land under Texas law, it must (in addition to three
other requirements that were not in dispute) touch and concern the land, and
whether the legal test includes a requirement of horizontal privity.
The Second Circuit found that it did not need to determine whether the
agreement “touches and concerns” the land, because it found that Texas law
still required horizontal privity and that test was not met in this case. In
order for the parties to the original agreement to have been in horizontal
privity with one another, there must have been some common interest in the
land other than the purported covenant itself at the time it was executed.116
The court agreed with the bankruptcy court that horizontal privity remained
a requirement of Texas real covenants.
The court then rejected Nordheim’s contention that horizontal privity of
estate is established through the separate agreements conveying the pipeline
easement and a separate parcel of land. The bankruptcy court below
determined that this separate conveyance was insufficient to establish
horizontal privity of estate. The Second Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy
court.117
The order of the district court was affirmed.
B. Court finds that the transportation of liquid propane is not an
ultrahazardous activity for purposes of strict liability.
The case of Elmore v. Dixie Pipeline Company,118 involved an appeal of
the trial court’s summary judgment rulings in favor of Dixie, as well as an
appeal of the court’s ruling that the testimony of plaintiff’s expert was
inadmissible as to the standard of care for pipeline operators and related
issues. Dixie operates a pipeline extending approximately 1,100 miles from
Texas to North Carolina. Liquid propane is transported through the
pipeline. On November 1, 2007, the pipeline ruptured at a location
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
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approximately 1.1 miles from Elmore’s home. Elmore sued Dixie, as
operator of the pipeline, asserting that “her house suffered structural
damage as a result of the shockwaves from the explosion.”119 Elmore
asserted claims of negligence, strict liability and punitive damages.
Prior to trial, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of
Dixie as to Elmore’s claims for strict liability, punitive damages and
negligence. The court also excluded the testimony of Elmore’s expert
witness Dr. Clarke, a metallurgical engineer. Elmore appealed.
As a foundational matter, the court recognized that the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the pipeline rupture at
issue in this case and reached certain conclusions. “Importantly, the NTSB
concluded that the following were not factors in the rupture: corrosion,
excavation damage, the controller’s actions, or the operating conditions of
the pipeline.”120 The NTSB ultimately concluded that “the probable cause”
of the subject pipeline rupture “was the failure of a weld that caused the
pipe to fracture along the longitudinal seam weld, a portion of the upstream
girth weld, and portions of the adjacent pipe joints.”121
The court of appeals addressed the exclusion of Dr. Clarke’s proposed
testimony regarding the standard of care of pipeline operators and the
alleged breach of that standard by Dixie. The court evaluated the proposed
expert testimony under Rule 702 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence122
and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.123 After reviewing in
detail the materials relied upon by Dr. Clarke, certain materials he did not
review and rely on, the information and opinions that would be relevant to
the plaintiff’s claims and conflicts between the NTSB’s report and the
opinions of Dr. Clarke, the court affirmed the circuit court’s exclusion of
his testimony. The court found in part: “Since Dr. Clarke lacked familiarity
with or understanding of the federal regulations and standards, the circuit

119. Id. at 502.
120. Id.
121. Id. (internal citation omitted)
122. Rule 702 stated at the time of these proceedings: “If scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or
determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education, may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if (1) the testimony
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is a product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case.” Id. at *3.
123. 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
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court properly excluded his ability to opine as to the standard of care for
pipeline operators or any violation of that standard of care by Dixie.”124
Turning to the circuit court’s dismissal of Elmore’s strict liability claims,
the court considered the six factors set forth in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS Section 520:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land[,] or chattels of others, (b) likelihood that the harm that
results from it will be great, (c) inability to eliminate the risk by
the exercise of reasonable care, (d) extent to which the activity is
not a matter of common usage, (e) inappropriateness of the
activity to the place it was carried on, and (f) extent to which its
value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.125
The court noted that the transportation of liquid propane is a regulated
commercial activity, subject to state and federal regulations. Moreover, it
found that “the transportation of liquid propane is of great value to
commerce and local, regional, and nationwide communities.”126 The court
concluded that, overall, the transportation of liquid propane does not
constitute an ultrahazardous activity.
With respect to the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s negligence
claim, in light of the exclusion of her expert’s testimony, Elmore asserted
on appeal that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should have been applied.
However, the court of appeals concluded that this doctrine was not
available to the plaintiff because the second element of the doctrine (i.e.,
“the injury must be such that in the ordinary course of things it would not
occur if those in control of the instrumentality used proper care”127) was not
demonstrated by the plaintiff. Rather, the court reviewed particular aspects
of the evidence presented to the circuit court and found that “there is simply
no evidence that in the ordinary course of things, the pipeline would not
have ruptured had Dixie used proper care.”128
Finally, the court concluded that its affirmance of the dismissal of the
plaintiff’s claims of strict liability and negligence rendered moot any
consideration of the circuit court’s dismissal of the claim for punitive
damages.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Elmore, 245 So.3d at 506.
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VI. Surface Use, Surface Damages, Oklahoma Surface Damages Act,
Condemnation and Environmental Cases
A. Court of Appeals upholds the “larger parcel” valuation method in
determining the value of the property taken.
The case of State ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. H&L Double MC,
LLP,129 involved a condemnation action filed by the Oklahoma Department
of Transportation (“ODOT”). The landowner filed this appeal from the trial
court’s journal entry on the jury verdict. The commissioners appointed by
the trial court to appraise the 3.36 acres of land at issue determined that
H&L was entitled to receive just compensation in the amount of
$103,850.00. H&L and the ODOT both filed demands for a jury trial,
although H&L later withdrew its demand.
At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury returned a verdict determining
the value of the taking to be $30,400.00. However, the verdict included a
note indicating a value of twenty-two cents a square foot. Because the
verdict could not be reconciled, the trial court granted H&L’s motion for
new trial. The case proceeded to a new, second trial. The jury returned a
verdict of $33,000.00. H&L appeals.
On appeal, H&L asserted that the trial court erred in the admission of
ODOT’s expert appraiser’s appraisal and his testimony regarding the same.
H&L alleged that Grace’s appraisal was based on a “larger parcel”
valuation method that was held unconstitutional in State ex rel. Department
of Transportation v. Caliber Development Co.130 However, the court of
appeals found that, contrary to H&L’s assertion, Caliber did not hold that
the larger parcel method of valuation was unconstitutional. In Caliber, with
respect to the larger parcel method, the court of appeals found the expert
was permitted to extensively testify about the valuation method. Contrary to
H&L’s assertions on appeal, the court of appeals did not address or hold
that the method was constitutionally invalid.
In this case, Grace specifically testified that he used the larger parcel
valuation method in determining a value for the property. H&L has not
provided the court with any authority that this is a constitutionally invalid
method of valuation. This assertion of error is denied.
H&L further asserts that Grace’s appraisal “was based on the
unconstitutional ‘before-and-after’ valuation method,”131 citing Caliber at ¶
129. 2018 OK CIV APP 54, 423 P.3d 702.
130. 2002 OK 60, ¶ 36, 52 P.3d 1014, 1033.
131. H&L Double MC, LLP, 2018 OK CIV APP 54, at ¶ 13.
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10. The court of appeals disagreed and found that Grace’s appraisal was
based on the larger parcel method. So, this assertion of error was denied.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment from the
conclusion of the second trial.
See also, State ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Pennington,132 in which
the court of appeals affirmed the judgment below, rejecting multiple
assertions by the landowner that the trial court erred in connection with the
condemnation proceedings below.
B. Court holds that wind energy developer’s excavation work in
construction of wind turbines constituted “mining” under federal
regulations applicable to the Indian lands.
The case of United States v. Osage Wind, LLC,133 involved a 2010 lease
by Osage Wind of solely surface rights to approximately 8,400 acres of
private fee land in Osage County, Oklahoma. Osage Wind leased the land
for the purpose of building a commercial wind farm—a facility that collects
and stores wind-generated electricity. The court described the proposed
project as follows:
The planned wind-farm involved the installation of eighty-four
wind turbines secured in the ground by reinforced concrete
foundations, underground electrical lines running between the
turbines and a substation, overhead transmission line,
meteorological towers, and access roads. These structures would
occupy around 1.5 percent of the total acreage of leased surface
land. In September 2011, OMC [Osage Mineral Council] and the
United States expressed concern that the planned project would
interfere with oil and gas production by blocking access to the
mineral estate.134
In light of the foregoing concern, the OMC filed suit in October 2011 to
prevent Osage Wind from constructing the proposed wind farm.135 In that
lawsuit, OMC alleged “that the planned wind farm would unlawfully
deprive OMC’s oil-and-gas lessees of reasonable use of the surface
estate.”136 The court ruled against OMC in that case because there was no
132. 417 P.3d 1274, 2018 OK CIV APP 39.
133. 871 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2017).
134. Id. at 1083.
135. See Osage Nation ex rel. Osage Minerals Council v. Wind Capital Grp., LLC, No.
11–CV–643–GKF–PJC, 2011 WL 6371384 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 2011).
136. Osage Wind, LLC, 871 F.3d at 1083 (10th Cir. 2017).
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evidence that the oil and gas lessees were planning to use the surface estate
in a manner that would conflict with Osage Wind’s proposed use of the
land.
In October 2013, Osage Wind began site preparation and road
construction for the wind farm. Excavation work for the wind turbines had
begun by September 2014.
Each turbine required the support of a cement foundation
measuring 10 feet deep and up to 60 feet in diameter. . . This
process involved the extraction of soil, sand, and rock of varying
sizes—all of which was of a common mineral variety, including
limestone and dolomite. Rock pieces smaller than 3 feet were
crushed into even smaller sizes.137
In November 2014, the United States, as trustee for the mineral estate on
behalf of the Osage tribe, sued Oklahoma Wind to halt the excavation work.
In that lawsuit, the U.S. ultimately sought damages based on the alleged
unauthorized extraction of reserved minerals. In particular, the U.S.
asserted that the sand, soil and rock extraction activities of Osage Wind
“was ‘mining’ under 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 and thus required a mineral lease
under 25 C.F.R. § 214.7.”138 The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of Osage Wind and ruled that the excavation work did not
constitute mining under Section 211.3, with the result that the leasing
requirement was not triggered under Section 214.7.
On the final day of the appeal deadline, the United States advised OMC
that it did not intend to appeal the district court’s ruling. Although the OMC
was not a party to the proceedings before the district court, the Tenth
Circuit allowed OMC to appeal the summary judgment. It found that OMC
had a “unique interest in this case entitling it to appeal without having
intervened below.”139
The Tenth Circuit began its review of the liability issues in the case by
describing its assessment of what it perceived to be key underlying facts:

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1086. The court emphasized that “[a] generalized interest in vindicating a legal
right is not enough to trigger our unique-interest exception. An interested person must have a
particularized and significant stake in the appeal, and must further demonstrate cause for
why he did not or could not intervene in the proceedings below. OMC’s interest here is
particularized and significant because the Osage Nation owns the beneficial interest in the
mineral estate at use.”
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Osage Wind engaged in large-scale mineral excavation work to
install wind turbines. It first removed rock sediment and soil
from the ground, creating large holes into which it could pour a
cement foundation for each turbine. Next, it sorted the extracted
rock material into small and large pieces, and then crushed the
smaller pieces so they would be the proper size for backfilling
the holes. Finally, it positioned the bigger rock pieces adjacent to
the backfilled excavation sites. All of this was done to add
structural support to the large wind turbines installed deep in the
ground. The question here is whether this excavation work—
digging, sorting, crushing, and backfilling—constitutes “mining”
under 25 C.F.R. § 211.3.140
The district court below “held that the definition of mining necessarily
involves the commercialization of mineral materials, i.e. the sale of
minerals.”141 The Tenth Circuit disagreed and found that the text of Section
211.3 “does not indicate that mining is confined to commercializing
extracted minerals or relocating them offsite—instead it refers merely to the
‘science, technique, and business of mineral of mineral development.’”142
The court also rejected Osage Wind’s contention that other regulations
suggest that Section 211.3 contemplates that “mining” involves the sale of
minerals.
The Tenth Circuit additionally recognized “the long-established principle
that ambiguity in laws designed to favor the Indians ought ‘to be liberally
construed’ in the Indians’ favor.”143
Importantly, the court agreed that “merely encountering or incidentally
disrupting mineral materials would not trigger § 211.3’s definition,” and
that “the simple removal of dirt does not constitute mining.”144 However,
the court noted that Osage Wind did not merely dig holes in the ground but
went further:
After Osage Wind removed the rock materials from each hole, it
acted upon the minerals by altering their natural size and shape
in order to take advantage of them for a structural purpose.
Osage Wind needed to stabilize these tall wind turbines, and

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 1087.
Id. at 1089.
Id.
Id. at 1090 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1091 (internal citation omitted).
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“develop[ed]” the removed rock in such a way that would
accomplish that goal.145
The Tenth Circuit concluded that “there is ambiguity in the scope of
‘mineral development’ and the extent to which that phrase includes the
sorting and crushing of minerals for the purpose of backfilling and
stabilization.”146 Citing again the rule that ambiguous laws designed to
favor the Indians are to be liberally construed in the Indians’ favor, the
court held that Osage Wind’s excavation work constituted mining under
Section 211.3 and that the company was required to secure a federallyapproved lease from OMC under Section 214.7. The summary judgment
ruling in favor of Osage Wind was reversed and the case was remanded for
further proceedings.
C. Court finds that plaintiff-town’s claims for trespass and nuisance with
respect to natural-gas compressor stations and metering station were
barred by limitations.
In Town of Dish v. Atmos Energy Corporation,147 the town filed suit on
February 8, 2011, against the defendant-owners of four natural gas
compressor stations and a metering station located just outside the town.
The town asserted claims for injuries based upon trespass and nuisance.
The evidence in the case showed that the residents of the town began
complaining about the noise and odor emanating from those facilities as
early as 2006, although arguments were made as to whether the operative
facts that would begin the running of the limitations period occurred as
early as 2006.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants
based on the two-year statute of limitations. The Texas Supreme Court
affirmed, finding that the defendant energy companies had “proven that any
legal injury the residents suffered commenced, at the latest, in May
2008.”148 As a result, the two-year statute of limitations barred the town’s
claims.

145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 1091-92.
Id. at 1092.
519 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. 2017).
Id. at 614.
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D. Court finds that county ordinance prohibiting storage and permanent
disposal of wastewater was preempted by state law.
Under the facts presented in EQT Production Company v. Wender,149
EQT operated one underground injection control well (UIC) located in
Fayette County, West Virginia. The well was used to dispose of
wastewater generated by hundreds of conventional vertical producing oil
and gas wells operated by EQT both within and outside the county. 150 EQT
injected the wastewater underground into a confined, underground
formation for permanent disposal.151 EQT’s operation of the UIC well was
subject to state regulations and was authorized by a state-issued permit.
Further, in the interest of protecting underground sources of drinking water,
EQT’s disposal operations were also subject to federal regulation
(administered by the state) under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §
300f et seq. which imposes certain regulations on injection wells.
Notwithstanding the state and federal regulations, Fayette County
enacted, on January 12, 2016, a blanket ban on all permanent disposal of
wastewater within the county.152 The Ordinance also banned the storage of
wastewater at conventional well sites.153 The Ordinance stated that the ban
would “specifically apply to injection wells for the purpose of permanently
disposing of natural gas waste and oil waste.”154 On January 13, 2016,
immediately after the ordinance was enacted, EQT filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia to enjoin
key aspects of the Ordinance as being preempted by state and federal law.
The district court entered a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction in favor of EQT.155 Both parties moved for summary judgment.
EQT argued that the Ordinance’s ban on operation of its state-licensed
injection well was preempted by West Virginia’s UIC permit program.
Because West Virginia’s UIC permit program was not only enacted
pursuant to state law and also mandated by the federal Safe Drinking Water
Act, EQT argued that the Ordinance’s ban on injection wells was
preempted by federal law. The district court granted summary judgment to

149. 870 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2017).
150. Id. at 327.
151. Id.
152. The ordinance was entitled “Ordinance Banning the Storage, Disposal, or Use of Oil
and Natural Gas Waste in Fayette County, West Virginia.” Id. at 327-328.
153. Id. at 336.
154. Id. at 328.
155. Id.
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EQT and permanently enjoined the challenged provisions of the
Ordinance.156 The defendants appealed.
In reviewing the preemption issues presented in this appeal, the Fourth
Circuit described one of the first questions to be addressed as being the
following:
Under West Virginia law, may the County prohibit EQT from
engaging in precisely the activity—permanent disposal of
wastewater at the UIC well—that has been sanctioned by a state
permit, effectively nullifying the license issued by West
Virginia’s DEP pursuant to state statutory authority? . . .We need
only determine whether a West Virginia county is authorized to
take aim at the permitted activity itself, enacting a blanket
prohibition on conduct specifically licensed by the state.157
The court observed that counties of the State have only the limited powers
granted to them by the West Virginia Constitution and the Legislature. The
court noted that it would make no sense to assume that the State would
delegate to a county, a creature of the State, the power to undo the State’s
permitting scheme.158 Finding that all local law in the State is subject to the
implied condition that the law may not be inconsistent with state law and
must yield to the predominant power of the state, the court held that the
Ordinance’s ban on the operation of EQT’s UIC well was preempted by
state law.
The County argued that the savings clause of the West Virginia Water
Pollution Control Act,159 which governs the state’s permitting of UIC wells,
recognized that the County had the authority to enact ordinances for the
elimination of hazards to the public health and to abate anything the
commission determined to be a public nuisance. The court found that the
County’s argument proposed an unreasonably broad interpretation of the
Water Pollution Control Act’s savings clause. The court concluded that a
more logical reading would be to view the clause as providing clarification
that the possession of a state permit would not preclude all local regulation
touching on the licensed activity. For example, the County might bring a
156. EQT Prod. Co. v. Wender, 191 F.Supp.3d 583, 603 (S.D.W. Va. 2016).
157. Wender, 870 F.3d at 332.
158. Id. at 333.
159. See W. VA. CODE § 22-11-27, which provide in part: “[N]othing herein contained
shall abridge or alter rights of action or remedies ..., nor shall any provisions ... be construed
as estopping the state, municipalities, public health officers, or persons ... in the exercise of
their rights to suppress nuisances or to abate any pollution....”
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common law action for public nuisance with respect to state-permitted UIC
wells. The Fourth Circuit noted that “[a] county has the ‘power to abate
nuisances, not to determine what shall be considered nuisances.’”160 The
court concluded that the Ordinance’s prohibition on all disposal of
wastewater in UIC wells was preempted by state law.
The court then reviewed the Ordinance’s restriction on the storage of
wastewater at conventional well sites. Having already found that the
Ordinance’s core prohibition on permanent wastewater disposal was
preempted, the court noted that there was little left to discuss concerning
the ancillary storage restriction. Considered separately, the Ordinance’s
restriction on storage was found to be inconsistent with the state Oil and
Gas Act and was preempted. The Oil and Gas Act vests the state
Department of Environmental Protection with “exclusive authority over
regulation of the state’s oil and gas resources, including ‘all matters’ related
to the ‘development, production, storage and recovery of this state’s oil and
gas.’”161 The court found that the DEP’s authority extended to the
regulation of the storage of wastewater at conventional production well
sites.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in all
respects.
E. Court resolves venue issues of lawsuit relating to injection wells
permitted by the Texas Railroad Commission.
The case of Ring Energy v. Trey Resources, Inc.,162 presented the first
impression question of “whether a trial court outside of Travis County has
the jurisdiction to enjoin a party with a valid permit from developing and
using an injection well based on the claims that the injection well will cause
imminent and irreparable injury to the complaining party.”163
Trey applied to the Texas Railroad Commission for nine permits to inject
fluids into designated wells located in Andrews County, Texas. On January
17, 2013, the Commission granted the applications without any formal
hearing.164 On September 23, 2013, and before any injection operations
began, Ring sued Trey in Andrews County. Ring first alleged that the
Commission permits were void ab initio due to an alleged failure to give
160. Wender, 870 F.3d at 336. (citing Sharon Steel Co. v. City of Fairmont, 334 S.E. 2d
616, 625 (W. Va. 1985)).
161. Id. (citing W. VA. CODE § 22-6-2(c)(12)).
162. 546 S.W.3d 199, (Tex. App. – El Paso 2017).
163. Id. at *1.
164. Id.
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proper notice to Trey’s predecessor. Ring further alleged that fluid injection
would cause substantial damage to Ring’s mineral interest and result in
waste, and it sought damages and equitable relief under TEX. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. § 85.321 (West 2011).165 Finally, Ring asserted “that its
interests were in imminent danger of irreparable harm, and sought a
temporary restraining order, and a temporary and permanent injunction.”166
Trey moved to dismiss Ring’s lawsuit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Trey argued that Ring failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies before the Commission, and that any appeal of the Commission’s
order(s) must be filed in Travis County, the county in which the Texas state
capitol, and the Commission, are located. Both sides agreed that damages
would be available if the injection wells did in fact cause injury, and that
Ring could seek pre-damage injunctive relief in Travis County. However,
Trey maintained that any suit outside of Travis County would be a
collateral attack on a permit issued by the Commission. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss. Ring appealed.
In rejecting Trey’s arguments and reversing the trial court’s order
dismissing Ring’s lawsuit, the Texas Court of Appeals emphasized in part
the following findings:
First, the general venue provisions in Texas permitted a suit to be filed
where all or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim
occurred.167 That venue would often be a county other than Travis
County.168
Second, the court rejected Trey’s argument that the Texas Railroad
Commission held exclusive jurisdiction over injection wells until all
administrative avenues had been exhausted. Under the Texas
Constitution,169 “[d]istrict courts are courts of general jurisdiction and
generally have subject matter jurisdiction absent a showing to the
contrary.”170
Finally, with respect to Trey’s assertion that Ring’s lawsuit was a
collateral attack on an order of the Commission, the court distinguished
cases relied upon by Trey as involving specific findings of the Commission
that were in conflict with the lawsuit in question. In this case, there were no
specific findings by the Commission that might provide the court with
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at *2.
Id.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(a) (West 2002).
Ring Energy, 546 S.W.3d at 211.
Tex. Const. art. V, § 8.
Ring Energy, 546 S.W.3d at 211.
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confidence “that the Commission’s expertise was actually applied to the
waste potential for the nine wells at issue.”171
For another lawsuit raising other issues with regard to claims by one
operator against another alleging that several injection wells were damaging
the plaintiff’s interests, see In re Discovery Operating, Inc.172
VII. Oklahoma Corporation Commission Matters
A. Court resolves dispute as to Commission proceedings brought pursuant
to the Oklahoma 2011 Shale Reservoir Development Act, now known as the
Oklahoma Extended Horizontal Well Development Act (SRDA).
In Continental Resources, Inc. v. Fairfield Mineral Company, LLC,173
Continental appealed the Oklahoma Corporation Commission’s order
issued on Continental’s application to have four separately designated
common sources of supply pooled into a single unit under the Oklahoma
2011 Shale Reservoir Development Act, now known as the Oklahoma
Extended Horizontal Well Development Act (SRDA).174
Continental had already completed a multi-unit horizontal well (the
Ritter well) in the Woodford formation. The evidence showed that the
Ritter well also penetrated the Mississippian formation. The Hunton
formation was shown to be beneath the Woodford. This qualified the
Hunton and Woodford to be each considered as “associated common
sources of supply” under the SRDA.
The Commission entered its order, now the subject of this appeal,
establishing the “Woodford Unit” as consisting of the Woodford common
source of supply and its associated common sources of supply (the
Mississippian and Hunton) “but only for the purpose of inadvertent
penetration into those formation.”175 The Commission’s order provided that
an owner who did not elect to participate in the already-drilled Woodford
well would relinquishment its rights in the Woodford; however, the owner
would only relinquish rights in the Mississippian and Hunton shale
formations as to a well that inadvertently penetrated those two
formations.176
171. Id. at 215.
172. 216 S.W.3d 898 (Tex. App. – Eastland 2007).
173. No. 116,284 (Companion with Case No. 116,285), Oklahoma Court of Appeals
(Decision Issued June 13, 2018 - Not for Publication).
174. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 87.6-87.9 (2011).
175. Opinion in No. 116,284, at page 6.
176. Id.
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The Commission interpreted the SRDA to limit use of each multi-unit
horizontal well to the development of a targeted reservoir. As a result,
according to the Commission, the additional Mississippian, Springer and
Hunton shale formations could not be developed by the Ritter well.
The order of the Commission provided for elections to participate in
drilling, or alternatively relinquishment of rights, separately as to each unit.
The order specifically stated that any owner subject to the order would have
the right to a separate election as between the Woodford, Mississippian and
Springer units. In sum, the Commission pooled the units but declined to
“aggregate” them for development, election and relinquishment purposes.
Continental appealed the order. It argued that it had the right to pool
several discrete common sources of supply such that owners in all the
pooled formations would be required to elect to participate in the cost of
drilling and completion of the Woodford well—or their right to drill in all
common sources of supply would be transferred by operation of law to
Continental. Fairfield protested, complaining inter alia that Continental had
declined to recommend separate elections for each of the formations.
After reviewing the case and applicable legal principles, the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals concluded that only the Woodford and its associated
common sources of supply were “affected units” for the Ritter well.
Consequently, this cause never reached consideration of the remaining
formations for possible pooling with the Woodford because they are not,
under the facts in this case, “affected units” for the Ritter well.177 The court
found that the result was that the SRDA does not, under the facts of this
case, provide authority for pooling the four formations.
In conclusion, the court held that Continental sought to aggregate the
four shale formations so as to require an election on the Ritter well or
relinquishment of rights to drill in all four shale formations. The
Commission denied that request and entered an order that pooled the
targeted formation and its associated common sources of supply and made
separate provisions for other formations. The court concluded that the
Commission’s denial of the application was in accord with general pooling
law principles applicable at the time of the decision. In addition, the
evidence here indicated that only the Woodford and its associated common
sources of supply were “affected units.” Therefore, the Commission was
found to have reached the correct result under the SRDA.
177. The court noted that the phrase “affected unit” is not separately defined in the OKLA.
STAT. tit. 52, § 87.8. However, the court found that the term clearly means the unit where
the well is drilled or proposed (here the Woodford unit) together with its associated common
sources of supply. Id. at 10.
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The decision of the Commission was affirmed. The court of appeals
specifically stated in its concluding findings that its opinion was limited to
the facts of the case.
VIII. Other Energy Industry Cases
A. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addresses objections to District Court
approval of class settlements in the so-called “hot fuel”178 litigation.
Proposed class action lawsuits continue to play a significant role in the
energy and resources litigation field. In In re Motor Fuel Temperature
Sales Practices Litigation,179 the court was presented with multiple
proposed class action suits in multiple states (later consolidated as
multidistrict litigation) filed on behalf of consumers who purchased
gasoline. The suits alleged that the defendant retailers of gasoline failed to
control for, or at least disclose, the effects of temperature on the energy
value of a gallon of gasoline purchased at the gas pump. 180 Several of the
parties entered into class settlements approved by the district court. The
present appeals focused on the district court’s approval of the settlement
agreements and its interpretation of one of the agreements. 181 While the
page limitations on this paper do not allow for a summary of the entire
lengthy opinion of the Tenth Circuit, a number of the court’s rulings are of
particular interest.
First, in addressing an interpretational argument, the court considered the
meaning and effect of the commonly-used phrase “including, without
limitation.” With respect to the use of that phrase in the paragraph of the
settlement agreement at issue with one of the appellants’ arguments, the
Tenth Circuit found:
Under [State v. Larson, 184 Wash.2d 843, 365 P.3d 740 (2015)],
we conclude that Section 4.7’s use of the phrase “including,
without limitation” indicates [that the listed contract types
provide] “illustrative examples” of the types of agreements that
will trigger Section 4.7, “rather than an exhaustive list” of the
agreements that will do so, 365 P.3d at 743. But, under Larson,
we likewise conclude that Section 4.7’s list of “illustrative
178. See Scott Cannon, “Attorneys fees ruling comes in ‘hot fuel,’” KANSAS CITY STAR
(Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.kansascity.com/news/business/article97684152.html.
179. 872 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 2017).
180. Id. at 1102.
181. Id.
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examples” nevertheless demonstrates an “inten[t] to limit the
scope of” Section 4.7 to agreements that are “similar” to those
examples. 365 P.3d at 743. And, under Larson, we reach that
conclusion despite the fact that Section 4.7 prefaces its list of
illustrative examples with the phrase “including, without
limitation.”182
Second, the court recognized the general rule that non-settling codefendants have no standing to object to a proposed class settlement,
because “they lack ‘a legally protected interest in the settlement’ and
therefore can’t satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement.”183 However,
the court found that a “‘[c]ourts have recognized a limited exception to this
rule where non-settling parties can demonstrate they are ‘prejudiced’ by a
settlement.’”184 The court noted that prejudice, in this context, “means
‘plain legal prejudice’ as when the settlement strips the party of a legal
claim or cause of action.”185 The Tenth Circuit concluded that plain legal
prejudice had not been not shown by the non-settling appellants who made
that assertion in this case.
Third, an appellant presented a novel argument regarding the inclusion of
go-forward provisions in the class settlements. Appellant objected to the
settlement agreements’ release provisions that enjoined settlement class
members from suing the defendants for future actions taken by the
defendants that were authorized or required by the settlement agreements.
The appellant argued that if a plaintiff tried to sue defendants today alleging
that their gasoline sales practices in future years would violate consumer
law, the complaint would be dismissed as unripe. But here, by calling the
document a settlement agreement rather than a complaint, appellant
contended that the court’s approval of the settlement agreements with their
future-conduct releases constituted an improper advisory opinion violative
of Article III standing principles. The court declined to consider this
argument for reasons described in the opinion.186
As a final example of issues of interest discussed in the Tenth Circuit’s
decision, appellants objected to provisions in certain of the settlement
agreements under which defendants “agreed to convert pumps at its existing
gas stations in certain states to Automatic Temperature Control (ATC)
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 1106.
Id. at 1110.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1115.
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pumps, and to install ATC pumps at its new gas stations in certain
states.”187 Appellants argued:
(1) regulators and policymakers have long debated requiring or
authorizing ATC at retail but have ultimately “chosen not to,” . .
. ; (2) selling gas by the gallon is lawful; (3) deciding whether to
use ATC is a policy decision best left to the legislature; (4) the
district court made an impermissible policy judgment about ATC
when it found that class members would derive some benefit
from the settlements to the extent that the settlements will
increase the odds of conversion to ATC; (5) what the plaintiffs
actually seek here is a change in the existing law, which is a
political remedy, not a judicial one; and (6) the district court
lacked authority to provide that political remedy under Article
III.188
The Tenth Circuit rejected this objection and noted that the lower court’s
approval of the settlement agreements did not order states to require, or
even to allow, conversion to ATC. Rather, that decision remains in the
hands of state lawmakers. The district court’s approval of the class
settlements did not usurp the legislature’s role.
The court affirmed the district court’s approval of the ten settlement
agreements at issue in this appeal.

187. Id. at 1103.
188. Id. at 1115.
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